Read the full civil lawsuit filed against Carbon Hill mayor

Read the full civil lawsuit filed against Carbon Hill mayor

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WALKER COUNTY, AL (WBRC) -

Below is a copy of the civil lawsuit filed against Carbon Hill mayor James Richardson.

Richardson was arrested Thursday evening and has been charged with four counts of sexual abuse in the first degree, four counts of custodial sexual misconduct, two counts of harassment and one count of soliciting a prostitute.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA JASPER DIVISION
Sherey PAGAY, Plaintiff vs. CIVIL ACTION NUMBER: 6:13-cv-01722-LSC James "Pee Wee" RICHARDSON, Individually and in his official capacity; and CITY OF CARBON HILL; Defendants.

AMENDED COMPLAINT COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Sherey PAGAY, by and through her attorneys
of record, Thomas L. Carmichael, Russell L. England, and Lisa M. Ivey, in the above-styled case and files this Amended Complaint1 and shows unto this Honorable Court as follows:

1 Plaintiff filed her original Complaint on September 17, 2013, using the pseudonym of Jane Doe and sought leave of Court to be allowed to proceed under that name. The Court denied Plaintiff's request to proceed under a pseudonym on September 19, 2013, and directed that the Plaintiff "must amend her complaint to substitute her real name within (10) days or the case will be dismissed." This Amended Complaint is being filed to comply with the Court's September 19, 2013, Order by substituting Plaintiff's real name of Sherey Pagay for the pseudonym of Jane Doe used in the original filing. All other allegations of the original filing remain as originally pled.

FILED
2013 Sep-19 PM 05:13
U.S. DISTRICT COURT N.D. OF ALABAMA
Case 6:13-cv-01722-LSC Document 5 Filed 09/19/13

I. INTRODUCTION:
1. This is a civil action for compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages and for declaratory relief. Plaintiff requests this Honorable Court declare that the acts and/or omissions by Defendants were unconstitutional under the United States Constitution; and, by an award of compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages, compensate Plaintiff for the violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights sufficient to deter the Defendants from further participation in such unconstitutional acts and/or omissions.

II. JURISDICTION and VENUE:
2. This action arises under and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to remedy the deprivations, under color of state law, of rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff's claims for declaratory relief are authorized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims (State Law Claims) alleged herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Case 6:13-cv-01722-LSC Document 5 Filed 09/19/13

3. The individual Defendant resides in Walker County, Alabama, and the municipal Defendant is located entirely within Walker County, Alabama, and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in Walker County, Alabama. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) and 1391(b)(2). Plaintiff asserts that the Jasper Division is the proper Division of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama for the filing of this action.

III. THE PARTIES:
4. The Plaintiff, Sherey Pagay, is an adult female citizen of Walker County Alabama, over the age of nineteen (19) years.
5. The Defendant, James "Pee Wee" Richardson, (hereinafter referred to as "Richardson"), is an adult male citizen of Walker County, Alabama, over the age of nineteen (19) years who was the Mayor of the City of Carbon Hill, Alabama, at all times relevant to this Complaint. Defendant Richardson is sued in his individual and official capacities.
6. The Defendant City of Carbon Hill (hereinafter referred to as "Carbon Hill") is a municipal governmental unit, located in the State of Alabama, County of (Case 6:13-cv-01722-LSC Document 5 Filed 09/19/13) Walker, organized and operating under the laws of the State of Alabama and the United States of America. Said Defendant, in concert with and as partners with the other Defendant named herein, funds, manages, directs and controls the city governmental operations, including but not limited to the Office of the Mayor of Carbon Hill and the Carbon Hill Police Department, including the Carbon Hill Police Department Jail.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO AND INCORPORATED
IN ALL COUNTS:
7. "Care, control, or supervision of" as used herein always refers to Ms. Pagay being under a sentence or commitment in a local penal institution.
8. Carbon Hill Police Department Jail is a local penal institution.
9. On or about April 17, 2013,2 Ms. Pagay was arrested and thereafter "booked" and held in the Carbon Hill Police Department Jail in the care, control, or supervision of Defendant Carbon Hill.
10. Ms. Pagay was not free to leave but was instead held under the care, control, or supervision of Defendant Carbon Hill in the Carbon Hill Police Department Jail.
2 Plaintiff is uncertain as to the calendar date of each of these events due to her incarceration. Counsel for the Plaintiff attempted to obtain specific dates that could be confirmed by the City Magistrate/City Clerk of Carbon Hill but such information was denied by the City Magistrate/City Clerk of Carbon Hill. Consequently, April 17, 2013, is Plaintiff's best approximation of a reference date and said date may be amended at a later time.
Case 6:13-cv-01722-LSC Document 5 Filed 09/19/13
11. Prior to May 6, 2013, Ms. Pagay and other inmates were from time to time taken from their cells and carried into the common areas of the Carbon Hill Police Department Jail and allowed access to food and drink machines and were generally supervised by and remained in the care, control, or supervision of Defendant Carbon Hill through a jailer or other police officer.
12. On other occasions prior to May 6, 2013, Ms. Pagay and other inmates were from time to time taken from their cells and carried outside and allowed to smoke and do other limited outside activities and were generally supervised by and remained in the care, control, or supervision of Defendant Carbon Hill through a jailer or other police officer.
13. On numerous occasions prior to May 6, 2013, Defendant Richardson was allowed access by Defendant Carbon Hill to the "cell" area of the jail where Ms. Pagay and other females were held and he identified himself as the "Mayor of Carbon Hill" or as the "Mayor" to Ms. Pagay and other females.
14. On numerous occasions prior to May 6, 2013, Defendant Richardson approached Ms. Pagay and other females while Ms. Pagay and other females were from time to time taken from their cells, as described above, and identified himself as the "Mayor of Carbon Hill" or as the "Mayor" to Ms. Pagay and other females. Each time the date of May 6, 2013, is used it is Plaintiff's best approximation of a reference date and said date may be amended at a later time. Case 6:13-cv-01722-LSC Document 5 Filed 09/19/13
15. Prior to May 6, 2013, Defendant Richardson would approach the female inmates, including Ms. Pagay, while they were inside their cells to talk to them often while the jailers and/or police officers were present.
16. Prior to May 6, 2013, Defendant Richardson would approach the female inmates, including Ms. Pagay, while they were outside their cells to talk to them often while the jailers and/or police officers were present.
17. Prior to May 6, 2013, it was routine for Defendant Richardson to use sexually suggestive conversation and sexual innuendos with the female inmates, including Ms. Pagay, during the times he would gain access to them as described hereinabove.
18. Prior to May 6, 2013, Defendant Richardson's conduct in using sexually suggestive conversation and sexual innuendos while conversing with female inmates was common knowledge to jailers and/or police officers of the Carbon Hill City Police Department.
19. Prior to May 6, 2013, the jailers and/or police officers of the Carbon Hill City Police Department were aware of allegations of sexual misconduct by Defendant Richardson during a previous term as Mayor of Carbon Hill.
20. On or about May 6, 2013, around 8 p.m., Ms. Pagay was taken from her cell under the pretense of again being allowed access to the food and drink machines while under the care, control, or supervision of Defendant Carbon Hill through a jailer.
21. On or about May 6, 2013, around 8 p.m., Defendant Richardson approached Ms. Pagay near the food and drink machines while she was under the care, control, or supervision of Defendant Carbon Hill through a jailer.
22. On or about May 6, 2013, around 8 p.m., Defendant Richardson, who had earlier made it known to Ms. Pagay that he was the "Mayor of Carbon Hill," stated to Ms. Pagay, "I need to talk to you come in my Office."
23. On or about May 6, 2013, around 8 p.m., the jailer who was with Ms. Pagay heard the directions given to Ms. Pagay by Defendant Richardson and directed Ms. Pagay into Defendant Richardson's Office but the jailer did not accompany Ms. Pagay.
24. Defendant Richardson immediately directed that Ms. Pagay close the door
upon her entering his Office.
25. Defendant Richardson thereafter directed that she sit in a chair at his desk.
26. Defendant Richardson then began talking to Ms. Pagay and asking her questions about certain cases the Carbon Hill Police Department was allegedly investigating and while Ms. Pagay was sitting in her chair as he had instructed her to do, Defendant Richardson was moving his chair closer to Ms. Pagay as he was talking to her.
27. Defendant Richardson then, without provocation or warning, groped Ms. Pagay by placing his right hand on her left thigh and he immediately began sliding his hand toward her "intimate parts" "for the purpose of his sexual arousal or gratification."
28. Upon realizing what Defendant Richardson was doing, Ms. Pagay immediately stood up from her chair in an attempt to get away from Defendant Richardson.
29. It took a brief moment for Ms. Pagay to locate the door because she was startled by Defendant Richardson's actions and she had not been in his Office before.
30. Defendant Richardson immediately got up from his chair and reached to
embrace Ms. Pagay.
31. Ms. Pagay turned from Defendant Richardson to head for the door when he then placed his hands on her back rubbing her down her back to her buttocks as she was reaching for the door knob and opened the door and fled Defendant Richardson's Office while telling him to get his hands off her.
32. Ms. Pagay felt threatened, feared for her safety, and immediately ran to her
cell.
33. Or in the alternative, Defendant Richardson's actions, in his subjecting Ms. Pagay to his touching and other physical contact, were intended to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, specifically Ms. Pagay. Further, Defendant Richardson's actions constituted a nonverbal threat, made with the intent to carry out the threat; that would cause a reasonable person who is the target of the threat to fear for her safety.
34. Ms. Pagay reported Defendant Richardson's actions the next morning to numerous personnel of the Carbon Hill Police Department and others.
35. At no time during any of the actions of Defendant Richardson, did Ms. Pagay provoke or desire to be subjected to the sexually suggestive conversations, sexual innuendoes, or sexual contact of Defendant Richardson.
36. Because of Defendant Carbon Hill's failure to provide adequate funding for composure, implementation, and enforcement of policies and procedures, and further training to ensure compliance with same, jail personnel or other officers who were responsible for the care, control, or supervision of Ms. Pagay did allow her to be subjected to the sexually suggestive conversations, sexual innuendoes, and sexual contact of Defendant Richardson while Ms.
Pagay was in their custody and failed to timely bring the overt and egregious violations of Ms. Pagay's constitutional rights to the attention of City Counsel or other governmental authority.
37. Defendant Richardson was at all times pertinent hereto an employee or contractual employee of a governmental agency of the state, county, or municipality that has by statute, ordinance, or court order the responsibility for the care, control, or supervision of pretrial or sentenced persons in a penal system or detention facility.
38. Defendant Richardson was at all times pertinent hereto an employee or contractual employee of Defendant Carbon Hill that had by statute, ordinance, or court order the responsibility for the care, control, or supervision of Ms. Pagay in the Carbon Hill Police Department Jail.
39. The "jailer", whether plural or singular, referred to hereinabove was at all times pertinent hereto an employee or contractual employee of a governmental agency of the state, county, or municipality that has by statute, ordinance, or court order the responsibility for the care, control, or supervision of pretrial or sentenced persons in a penal system or detention
facility.
40. The "jailer", whether plural or singular, referred to hereinabove was at all times pertinent hereto an employee or contractual employee of Defendant Carbon Hill that had by statute, ordinance, or court order the responsibility for the care, control, or supervision of Ms. Pagay in the Carbon Hill Police Department Jail.
41. The "other officer", whether plural or singular, referred to hereinabove was at all times pertinent hereto an employee or contractual employee of a governmental agency of the state, county, or municipality that has by statute, ordinance, or court order the responsibility for the care, control, or supervision of pretrial or sentenced persons in a penal system or detention
facility.
42. The "other officer", whether plural or singular, referred to hereinabove was at all times pertinent hereto an employee or contractual employee of Defendant Carbon Hill that had by statute, ordinance, or court order the responsibility for the care, control, or supervision of Ms. Pagay in the Carbon Hill Police Department Jail.
43. While committing all of the acts above, Defendant Richardson's acts were:
a. Acts which Defendant Carbon Hill sanctioned or ordered;
b. Acts of a municipal officer with final policy-making authority; and
c. Were actions taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official—Mayor of
Carbon Hill.
44. While committing all of the acts above, Defendant Richardson was acting pursuant to "customs or practice" of the Defendants named herein.
45. Defendant Carbon Hill had actual notice of Defendant Richardson's pattern of conduct wherein Defendant Carbon Hill's jailers and/or other officers had been present and overheard and/or viewed prior misconduct of Richardson subjecting females to improper sexually suggestive conversation, sexual innuendoes, and sexual contact and other improper conduct not becoming of a person in Defendant Richardson's position, including but not limited to:
a. Defendant Richardson subjecting numerous other female inmates to improper sexually suggestive conversation and sexual innuendoes;
b. Defendant Richardson subjecting at least one other female inmate to improper sexually suggestive conversation, sexual innuendoes, and sexual contact;
c. Defendant Richardson subjecting another female inmate to improper sexually suggestive conversation, sexual innuendoes, and causing said female to view pornographic materials; and
d. Defendant Richardson's similar inappropriate and improper conduct perpetrated on or toward female employees/personnel during a previous term as Mayor of Carbon Hill resulting in civil claims being made against the City of Carbon Hill.
46. Defendant Carbon Hill, with knowledge of the foregoing, ignored a known or obvious risk that Defendant Richardson was highly likely to engage in sexual harassment and sexual contact of the nature described hereinabove if given an opportunity to gain access of any kind to female inmates of the Carbon Hill Police Department Jail.
47. Defendant Carbon Hill acted with deliberate indifference in its failure to restrict Defendant Richardson from contact with female inmates.
48. Defendant Carbon Hill acted with deliberate indifference in its failure to provide adequate funding for composure, implementation, and enforcement of policies and procedures, and further training to ensure compliance with same, by jail personnel or other officers who were responsible for the care, control, or supervision of Ms. Pagay who did allow her to be subjected to sexual harassment through the sexually suggestive conversations, sexual innuendoes, and sexual contact of Defendant Richardson while Ms. Pagay was in their custody and failed to timely bring the overt and egregious violations of Ms. Pagay's constitutional rights to the attention of City Counsel or other governmental authority.
49. While committing all of the acts above, Defendant Richardson was acting "under color of State law."
50. The personnel of Defendant Carbon Hill, including but not limited to the jailers and other officers, in committing all of the acts above, were acting "under color of State law."
51. Defendant Carbon Hill has had direct notice of Defendant Richardson's history of widespread abuse of policy, procedure, and failure to follow protocol which resulted in the violation of citizens' constitutional rights, including but not limited to, those events listed hereinabove, thereby giving Defendant Carbon Hill notice of the need to correct the deprivation.
52. Defendant Carbon Hill's direct notice of Defendant Richardson's, jailer's, and other officer's history of widespread abuse of policy, procedure, and failure to follow protocol which resulted in the violation of citizens' constitutional rights, including but not limited to, those events listed
hereinabove, thereby giving Defendant Carbon Hill notice of the need to provide increased and/or adequate funding to address and correct the deprivation.
53. Defendant Richardson's conduct in subjecting Ms. Pagay to the sexual harassment, sexual contact or physical contact of this nature, as described with more particularity hereinabove, deprived Ms. Pagay of her personal liberty and civil rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
54. Defendant Richardson's conduct, as described with more particularity hereinabove, is so egregious as to amount to willful or malicious conduct or conduct engaged in bad faith.
55. In the aforesaid transactions the Defendants occupied towards Plaintiff a superior position in that by law Plaintiff was in Defendants' care, control or supervision and required to comply with their direction.
56. The Plaintiff trusted and placed confidence in Defendant Carbon Hill to protect her.

FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS:
COUNT ONE
(Sexual Contact/Sexual Harassment—Defendant Richardson)
CIVIL RIGHTS—42 U.S.C. § 1983
57. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
58. Defendant Richardson while acting under the color of State law as Mayor of the City of Carbon Hill, intentionally violated Ms. Pagay's constitutional right not to be groped, molested, subjected to sexual touching, nor be sexually harassed either verbally or physically.
59. Defendant Richardson while acting under the color of State law as Mayor of the City of Carbon Hill, did act with malice or reckless indifference to Ms. Pagay's federally protected rights and in doing so he intentionally violated Ms. Pagay's constitutional right not to be groped, molested, subjected to sexual touching, nor be sexually harassed either verbally or physically.
60. All the acts or omissions of Defendant Richardson, as described hereinabove, were done while Defendant Richardson was purporting or pretending to act in the performance of official duty; that is, the unlawful acts were an abuse or misuse of power which Defendant Richardson
possessed only because of the position he held as a Mayor of the City of Carbon Hill.
61. The Plaintiff continues to suffer mental anguish, psychological and
emotional distress.
62. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Richardson's actions, Plaintiff was injured, damaged, and deprived of rights, privileges and immunities under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama.
63. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendant Richardson, individually and in his official capacity, for said constitutional violations as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
COUNT TWO
(Sexual Contact/Sexual Harassment—Defendant Carbon Hill)
CIVIL RIGHTS—42 U.S.C. § 1983
64. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
65. Defendant City of Carbon Hill by and through its Mayor, jailers, or other officers while each was acting under the color of State law as Mayor of the City of Carbon Hill, jailer of the Carbon Hill Police Department, or officer of the Carbon Hill Police Department, intentionally violated Ms. Pagay's constitutional right not to be groped, molested, subjected to sexual touching, or be sexually harassed either verbally or physically.
66. Defendant City of Carbon Hill by and through its Mayor, jailers, or other officers while each was acting under the color of State law as Mayor of the City of Carbon Hill, jailer of the Carbon Hill Police Department, or officer of the Carbon Hill Police Department, did act with malice or reckless indifference to Ms. Pagay's federally protected rights and in doing so it intentionally violated Ms. Pagay's constitutional right not to be groped, molested, subjected to sexual touching, or be sexually harassed either verbally or physically.
67. All the acts or omissions of Defendant City of Carbon Hill by and through its Mayor, jailers, or other officers, as described hereinabove, were done while its Mayor, jailers or other officers were purporting or pretending to act in the performance of official duty; that is, the unlawful acts were an abuse or misuse of power which Defendant Carbon Hill possessed only because of the position its persons held as a Mayor of the City of Carbon Hill, jailer of the Carbon Hill Police Department, or officer of the Carbon Hill Police Department.
68. The Plaintiff continues to suffer mental anguish, psychological and emotional distress.
69. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant Carbon Hill's actions, Plaintiff was injured, damaged, and deprived of rights, privileges and immunities under the Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the laws of the State of Alabama.
70. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendant Carbon Hill for said constitutional violations as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
COUNT THREE
(Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior—Defendant Carbon Hill)
CIVIL RIGHTS—42 U.S.C. § 1983
71. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
72. Defendant Carbon Hill as a matter of custom and practice, has with deliberate indifference, failed to adequately discipline, train, and supervise the day-to-day activities of the Mayor of Carbon Hill and the Carbon Hill Police Department jail personnel, or otherwise direct police officers concerning the rights of citizens, thereby causing Defendant Richardson, jailers and other officers in this case to engage in unlawful conduct described hereinabove. This failure to train includes a failure to train in the protection of its female inmates to ensure that same are not subjected to sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, sexually suggestive conversation,
sexual innuendoes, and sexual contact by anyone while in the care, control, or supervision of Defendant Carbon Hill.
73. Defendant Carbon Hill, as a matter of custom and practice, has with deliberate indifference, failed to adequately provide funding to adequately discipline, train, supervise the day-to-day activities of the Mayor, jailers, or other officers, or otherwise direct police officers concerning the rights of citizens, thereby causing Defendant Richardson, jailers and other officers in this case to engage in unlawful conduct described hereinabove. This failure to train includes a failure to train in the protection of its female inmates to ensure that same are not subjected to sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, sexually suggestive conversation, sexual innuendoes, and
sexual contact by anyone while in the care, control, or supervision of Defendant Carbon Hill.
74. Defendant Carbon Hill as a matter of custom and practice, has with deliberate indifference, failed to adequately provide funding to properly sanction or discipline its Mayor, police officers and jail personnel, including Defendant Richardson in this case, for violations of constitutional rights of citizens, thereby causing the Mayor, jail personnel and police officers, including Defendant Richardson and jail personnel and other officers in this case, to engage in said unlawful conduct.
75. Defendant Carbon Hill as a matter of custom and practice, has with deliberate indifference, failed to properly sanction or discipline its Mayor, police officers and jail personnel, including Defendant Richardson in this case, for violations of constitutional rights of citizens, thereby causing the Mayor, jail personnel and police officers, including Defendant Richardson and jail personnel and other officers in this case, to engage in said unlawful conduct.
76. Defendant Richardson's, other officer's, and jail personnel's obvious, flagrant, and rampant behavior, has continued across a lengthy period of time and in doing so is sufficient to put Defendant Carbon Hill on notice of history of widespread abuse of policy, procedure, and failure to follow protocol which resulted in the violation of citizens' constitutional rights, including but not limited to, those events listed hereinabove, thereby giving Defendant Carbon Hill notice of the need to correct the deprivation.
77. That the conduct of Defendant Richardson, other officers, and other jail personnel described herein was not an isolated incident, but instead, is just one incident evidencing a widespread custom and practice of Defendant Carbon Hill allowing Defendant Richardson, jailers, and other officers to engage in said unlawful conduct.
78. That Defendant Carbon Hill had actual and/or constructive notice of similar past acts or omissions of Defendant Richardson, other officers, and other jail personnel, sufficient to place said Defendant Carbon Hill on notice of Defendant Richardson's propensity to engage in similar conduct generally, and specifically the conduct described hereinabove.
79. All of the aforementioned acts and others known to Defendant Carbon Hill placed Defendant Carbon Hill on notice of the need for additional funding to the Carbon Hill City Police Department.
80. The Plaintiff prays for damages against Defendant Carbon Hill for its constitutional failure to adequately supervise, discipline and for the implicit approval of the sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, sexually suggestive conversation, sexual innuendoes, and sexual contact by anyone while in the care, control, or supervision of Defendant Carbon Hill generally, which resulted in the continued wrongful actions under color of state law which proximately caused Ms. Pagay to be injured and damaged.
81. The Plaintiff prays for damages against Defendant Carbon Hill for its failure to provide adequate funding to the Carbon Hill Police Department which proximately caused the constitutional failures set forth more specifically hereinabove, which resulted in the continued wrongful actions under color of state law which proximately caused Ms. Pagay to be injured and damaged.
82. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendant Carbon Hill for said constitutional violations as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
COUNT FOUR
DECLARATORY RELIEF
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202
83. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
84. That the acts, omissions and/or conduct of Defendant Carbon Hill, as described more particularly hereinabove, are the direct and proximate result of the Defendant's failure to compose, implement, enforce policies and procedures, and/or provide adequate funding to effectuate the foregoing, to ensure the police employees are not violating the federally protected and Constitutional rights of citizens.
85. The Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and a preliminary and a permanent injunction ordering these defendants to compose, implement, and/or enforce proper existing policies or alternatively restraining them from continuing to engage in a pattern and practice of deliberate indifference and/or implicit approval of the unlawful search, seizure and arrest of persons generally which is a violation of federally protected and Constitutional rights of citizens as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
STATE LAW CLAIMS:
COUNT FIVE
(Negligence/Wantonness—Defendant Richardson)
86. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
87. Defendant Richardson, as Mayor of Carbon Hill, had a duty to oversee city functions and to ensure the City of Carbon Hill was complying with its laws, ordinances, regulations, rules, and/or standards of operating procedures, as well as the laws and regulations of the State of Alabama, the Alabama Constitution, and the United States Constitution—specifically as to the care, control, or supervision and protection of female inmates.
88. Defendant Richardson failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and was negligent and/or wanton in overseeing city functions.
89. Defendant Richardson, as Mayor of Carbon Hill, breached his duty in his failure to oversee city functions and ensure that the City of Carbon Hill, specifically the Carbon Hill Police Department, was complying with its laws, ordinances, regulations, rules, and/or standards of operating procedures, as well as the laws and regulations of the State of Alabama, the Alabama Constitution, and the United States Constitution—specifically as to the care, control, or supervision and protection of female inmates.
90. Defendant Richardson, as Mayor of Carbon Hill, had a duty to oversee city functions and to ensure the City of Carbon Hill was complying with its laws, ordinances, regulations, rules, and/or standards of operating procedures, as well as the laws and regulations of the State of Alabama, the Alabama Constitution, and the United States Constitution—specifically as to the care, control, or supervision and protection of female inmates.
91. Defendant Richardson failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and was negligent and/or wanton in overseeing city functions.
92. Defendant Richardson, as Mayor of Carbon Hill, breached his duty in his failure to oversee city functions and ensure that the City of Carbon Hill, specifically the Carbon Hill Police Department, was complying with its laws, ordinances, regulations, rules, and/or standards of operating procedures, as well as the laws and regulations of the State of Alabama, the Alabama Constitution, and the United States Constitution—specifically as to the care,
control, or supervision and protection of female inmates.
93. As a proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has been personally injured and damaged.
94. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendant Richardson, individually and in his official capacity, for said acts or omissions as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
COUNT SIX
(Negligence/Wantonness—Defendant Carbon Hill)
95. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
96. Defendant Carbon Hill had a duty to oversee city functions and to ensure the Mayor of Carbon Hill and the City of Carbon Hill Police Department were complying with its laws, ordinances, regulations, rules, and/or standards of operating procedures, as well as the laws and regulations of the State of Alabama, the Alabama Constitution, and the United States Constitution—specifically as to the care, control, or supervision and protection of female
inmates.
97. Defendant Carbon Hill failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and was negligent and/or wanton in overseeing city functions generally, and specifically as described hereinabove the actions of its personnel.
98. Defendant Carbon Hill breached his duty in its failure to oversee city functions and ensure that the City of Carbon Hill, specifically as described herein above the actions of its personnel, were complying with its laws, ordinances, regulations, rules, and/or standards of operating procedures, as well as the laws and regulations of the State of Alabama, the Alabama Constitution, and the United States Constitution—specifically as to the care, control, or supervision and protection of female inmates.
99. As a proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has been personally injured and
damaged.
100. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendant Carbon Hill for said acts or omissions as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
COUNT SEVEN
(Negligence Per Se—Defendant Richardson)
HARASSMENT— Alabama Code § 13A-11-8
101. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
102. Defendant Richardson's actions, in his subjecting Ms. Pagay to his touching and other physical contact, were intended to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, specifically Ms. Pagay.
103. Defendant Richardson's actions constituted a nonverbal threat, made with the intent to carry out the threat; that would cause a reasonable person who is the target of the threat to fear for her safety.
104. Ms. Pagay felt threatened and feared for her safety.
105. Defendant Richardson violated Alabama Code § 13A-11-8 in engaging in the described conduct.
106. Alabama Code § 13A-11-8 was enacted to protect a class of persons which includes Ms. Pagay.
107. The injury to Ms. Pagay was that contemplated by Alabama Code § 13A-11-
8.
108. Defendant Richardson, in his individual and official capacity, violated Alabama Code § 13A-11-8 as described more specifically hereinabove.
109. As a proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has been personally injured and damaged.
110. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendant Richardson, individually and in his official capacity, for said acts or omissions as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
COUNT EIGHT
(Negligence Per Se—Defendant Richardson)
PROHIBITED ACTS— Alabama Code § 14-11-3
111. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
112. Defendant Richardson engaged in sexual conduct with Ms. Pagay, as described more specifically hereinabove, who at all times was a person under the supervisory, disciplinary, or custodial authority of Defendant Richardson.
113. Defendant Richardson violated Alabama Code § 14-11-31 in engaging in the described conduct.
114. Alabama Code § 14-11-31 was enacted to protect a class of persons which includes Ms. Pagay.
115. The injury to Ms. Pagay was that contemplated by Alabama Code § 14-11-31.
116. Defendant Richardson, in his individual and official capacity, violated Alabama Code § 14-11-31 as described more specifically hereinabove.
117. As a proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has been personally injured and damaged.
118. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendant Richardson, individually and in his official capacity, for said acts or omissions as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
COUNT NINE
(Civil Conspiracy—Defendants Richardson & Carbon Hill)
119. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
120. Defendants Richardson and Carbon Hill in combination, conspired together in a concerted action, as a part of pattern and practice of acts and omissions, as described more specifically hereinabove, to generally subject female inmates and specifically subject Ms. Pagay to sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, sexually suggestive conversation, sexual innuendoes, and
sexual contact.
121. As a proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has been personally injured and damaged.
122. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendants Richardson, individually and in his official capacity, and Carbon Hill, jointly and severally, for said acts or omissions as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
COUNT TEN
(Outrage—Defendants Richardson & Carbon Hill)
123. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
124. The conduct of Defendants Richardson and Carbon Hill is so outrageous and unconscionable a behavior, as described more specifically hereinabove, to generally subject female inmates and specifically subject Ms. Pagay to sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, sexually suggestive conversation, sexual innuendoes, and sexual contact as to shock the social conscience of the community and as to deviate from the socially accepted norms and standards
of the community as a whole.
125. As a proximate result thereof, Plaintiff has been personally injured and damaged.
126. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendants Richardson, individually and in his official capacity, and Carbon Hill, jointly and severally, for said acts or omissions as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief"
which is herein incorporated by reference.
COUNT ELEVEN
(Respondeat Superior—Defendant Carbon Hill)
127. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by this reference each and every allegation of each paragraph hereinabove as though set forth in full herein.
128. By virtue of the fact that the Carbon Hill Police Department "jailers," Carbon Hill Police Department "other officers," and Defendant Richardson are agents in fact, agents in law, and/or agents, servants, or employees of Defendant Carbon Hill, Defendant Carbon Hill is vicariously liable for the acts and/or omissions, jointly and severally, of the Carbon Hill Police
Department "jailers," Carbon Hill Police Department "other officers," and Defendant Richardson, as more fully described herein.
129. As a proximate result of the Defendants' act and/or omissions as describe more specifically hereinabove, Plaintiff has been personally injured and damaged.
130. The Plaintiff claims damages against Defendant Carbon Hill for said acts or omissions as prayed for below in the "General Prayer for Relief" which is herein incorporated by reference.
V. GENERAL PRAYER FOR RELIEF:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays for the
following relief:
a. Compensatory damages as allowed by Federal and State law;
b. Statutory damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988;
c. Punitive damages as allowed by Federal and State law;
d. Reasonable attorneys' fees, court cost and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or otherwise appropriate;
e. That the Court determine and declare the actions of Defendant Richardson to be improper, illegal and/or unconstitutional and as such void and without legal effect;
f. Order the Defendant Carbon Hill, its officers, agents, and employees to refrain from engaging in any of the predicate unconstitutional acts forming the basis of the pattern or practice of unlawful conduct described herein;
g. Order the Defendant Carbon Hill, its officers, agents, and employees to adopt and implement policies, procedures, and mechanisms to remedy the pattern or practice of unlawful conduct described herein, and by specifically addressing, inter alia, the following areas: policies and training; policing and jail operations; supervision; misconduct complaint intake, investigation, and adjudication; retaliation; oversight and transparency; and community
engagement;
h. Order Defendant Carbon Hill to provide adequate funding to compose, effectuate the adoption and implementation of policies, procedures, and mechanisms to remedy the pattern or practice of unlawful conduct described herein; and
i. That the Court grant the Plaintiff such other further relief as deemed fair and equitable.
VI. JURY DEMAND:
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY.
//s// Thomas L. Carmichael
Attorney for Plaintiff
Respectfully submitted,
//s// Thomas L. Carmichael
THOMAS L. CARMICHAEL (CAR133)
ASB-1587-A34T
Attorney for Plaintiff
CARMICHAEL LAW FIRM, LLC
301 N. Walston Bridge Rd., Suite 100
Jasper, Alabama 35504
(205) 302-0099
tlc4injury@yahoo.com
//s// Russell L. England
RUSSELL L. ENGLAND (ENG017)
ASB-7450-R52E
Attorney for Plaintiff
MONCUS & ENGLAND, P.C.
3178 D Pelham Parkway
Pelham, Alabama 35124
(205) 664-9088
russell@moncusengland.com
//s// Lisa M. Ivey
LISA M. IVEY (IVE004)
ASB-2264-A36I
Attorney for Plaintiff
301 N. Walston Bridge Rd., Suite 100A
Jasper, Alabama 35504
(205) 302-3894&, lt;, /div>
lmivey@sonet.net

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